

DIIS REPORT

**THE EU ENLARGEMENT
EASTWARDS AND THE ESDP**

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Abstract

This report investigates the opportunities within common European Security and Defence Policies arising from the 2004 EU Enlargement with 10 new Member States and the limitations that can be expected to be at work. The enlargement will influence EU decision making in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, specifically the European Security and Defence Policy, and may modify its geographical and functional focus. The descriptive analysis rests on interviews with policy and decision makers in Brussels as well as on European research networks. Predictive analysis points in the direction of an expanded global role of the EU involving all Member States, in combination with an international division of labour. The conclusions of this report foresee continued development of integrated civilian and military capabilities and methods of crisis management. However, the proclaimed global role of the EU depends to a large extent on the European ability to generate sufficient resources to overcome shortfalls in enabling factors of the ESDP. The most probable first consequence of the EU enlargement eastwards might be a higher priority of the ESDP with the new neighbouring areas to the East and Southeast.

Resumé på dansk

Rapporten undersøger muligheder og begrænsninger i den fælles Europæiske Sikkerheds- og Forsvarspolitik som følge af EU's udvidelse i 2004 med 10 nye medlemmer. Udvidelsen vil øve indflydelse på beslutninger om den Fælles Udenrigs- og Sikkerhedspolitik, herunder den Europæiske Sikkerheds- og Forsvarspolitik, og kan indvirke på dens geografiske og funktionelle sigte. Den beskrivende analyse bygger på interviews med beslutningstagere i Bruxelles og med europæiske forskere. Den fremskrivende analyse peger i retning af en udvidet global rolle for EU med inddragelse af alle medlemsstater i kombination med en international arbejdsdeling. Konklusionerne forudsiger fortsat udvikling af integrerede civile og militære indsatser og metoder til krisestyring. Den eftertragtede globale rolle for EU afhænger imidlertid meget af den europæiske evne til at stille tilstrækkelige ressourcer til rådighed for at overvinde mangler indenfor den Europæiske Sikkerheds- og Forsvarspolitik. Den første konsekvens af EU's østudvidelse kan derfor nemt blive, at denne politik i stedet rettes mere mod EU's naboer mod øst og sydøst.

Introduction

The EU enlargement approved at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 intended to further the process of European integration and establish a post-Cold War security architecture for Europe. After the collapse of the economic, political and military division between East and West in Europe, common legislation and internal procedures aiming at free movement of goods, persons, capital and services, were expected to have the potential to create a substantially new, global player in international relations. The new EU member states accepted existing legislation and common policies in the form of the ‘*acquis communautaire*’. In the field of foreign relations, the ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, CFSP, did not raise significant problems during enlargement negotiations, presumably because it is to a considerable extent declaratory in nature.¹ In comparison with other chapters of the ‘*acquis*’ the CFSP does not significantly raise questions of domestic adjustments or legislation or of budgetary burdens for either side. The ‘European Security and Defence Policy’, ESDP, as part of CFSP might be a different matter, since the ESDP is far more concrete and operational involving military as well as police missions abroad.

In order to assess whether a global role as stated in mainstream EU discourse as an expectation of the eastward enlargement will materialize, it would be pertinent to ask if the EU will broaden the scope of the ESDP to more overseas operations, to begin with primarily in Africa? Secretary General Solana is convinced that 2005 will be a crucial year for the political development of the EU. He believes that the EU will speak with one voice and improve crisis management capabilities, which work for the “global common good”, describing EU’s global role and ambition.² Will the EU after enlargement be able to speak with one voice, or will decision making become even more complicated? The fact that enlargement is mainly an eastward process, does it mean that the focus of the ESDP will also be shifted eastwards? If so, would such a shift of focus diminish the likelihood of the EU fulfilling the ambition of a global role?

The answers to these questions depend to a large degree on what the new member states will be able to contribute with, firstly in respect of ESDP strategies and

¹ Missiroli, 2004, p.122, Missiroli, 2003 (1), p.3.

² Javier Solana, “Shaping an effective EU Foreign Policy”, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 24 January 2005.

secondly in respect of capabilities. As a special aspect of this discussion it would be obvious to expect that newly transformed, former communist countries would be able to add further experience and capabilities to ESDP operations in order to make them more efficient in the field of security sector reform.

The likely consequences of EU enlargement on ESDP strategies and capabilities was the subject of a number of interviews with policy and decision makers in Brussels, international as well as national, and with European research networks in the autumn of 2004 in order to expose expectations in the EU Headquarters where preparations are made.

The EU Enlargement Eastwards

This analysis chooses to focus on the eastward dimension of the EU Enlargement, and therefore only four of the ten new EU members, namely the Visegrad Group of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. These four countries are clearly distinct among the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and they are relatively homogeneous compared to the other new members, in that they have historically undergone a similar process of democratic and economic as well as technological and industrial development.³ None of these countries, although having been under Soviet control until recently, are former members of either the Soviet Union as the Baltic states, or Yugoslavia such as Slovenia, and therefore not newly independent and inexperienced actors in international relations. Furthermore they are all relatively middle size players in international politics, having developed armed forces and national defence industries of a certain size. Contrary to the new Mediterranean members Cyprus and Malta – which are not Partners-for-Peace of NATO – they are also members of NATO. NATO standards are the foundation of the joint Czech-Polish-Slovak brigade prepared for international peace operations to be operational in 2005. Furthermore, the Visegrad countries are acting as a group in matters of economy. They were all in the 1990s members of the Central European Free Trade Agreement, CEFTA, and are now mutually competing for direct foreign investments, but also presenting themselves to investors as a regional market within the EU.

The classical political discourse on European integration leading to a 'security-community' claimed that a fundamental dichotomy exists between widening and deepening of the possible cooperation within the institutional framework created over the last 50 years. This perceived dichotomy, however, seems not altogether confirmed by the enlargements of the EU that took place in 1973, 1986 and 1995 (Greece joined the European Communities separately in 1981). When Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the EC in 1973, the widening of the membership was accompanied by deepening by establishment of Free Trade. When Portugal and Spain joined 13 years later in 1986, the enlargement took place in the same period as the Single Market was established. And the 1995

³ Khol, 2003, p.1.

enlargement after the Maastricht Treaty by Austria, Finland and Sweden was accompanied by introduction of new powers in the field of Justice and Home affairs, and at the same time marked the initiative for the common Euro-currency. These examples are all of major importance to European integration, and in addition to them, the various enlargements have all been followed by major changes in decision making procedures and voting rights in order to maintain effectiveness of cooperation. According to such a description of widening and deepening, the overall picture seems rather to show some kind of generic connection between the two categories. The 2004 widening of the EU could thus be expected to be parallel to a deepening of the European integration.

The new EU member states from 1 May 2004 had been expected in general to offer fresh chances and capabilities for realization of fundamental goals and ambitions. Basically the new members might be expected to be keen to bring added value to the scope of EU crisis management and to contribute to the EU capabilities with their specific experiences and resources.⁴ In particular the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe could be expected to possess highly valuable knowledge concerning transformation processes, restructuring of all areas of society, democratization and the rule of law.⁵ Externally they could thereby enrich the EU capacity to respond to an even broader range of demands in crisis situations. A critical examination would reveal, however, that the ESDP, primarily relying on the resources that the members are willing and able to commit, is victim of major imbalances among EU partners.⁶ Such imbalances are of course not created by the enlargement, but it has made them more acute. While all EU members are formally equal in representation and decision-making, some are 'more equal' than others in terms of capabilities that may be needed to conduct an effective ESDP, be they military (forces, equipment, industrial base), civilian or diplomatic. It is to be noted that with enlargement the population of the EU has increased with one fifth, although the GDP only a few percent, coupled with an increase in the number of smaller Member States from 10 to 19, including now 11 with a population of 5 million or less.

In addition heterogeneity could not be expected to have positive influence on the effectiveness of the CFSP and concerning the more specific European Security

⁴ Shepherd, p. 60-61.

⁵ Longhurst, p. 390, Khol, 2003, p. 15.

⁶ Gnesotto, 2004 (1), Missiroli, Antonio, "The ESDP – How it works", p.70.

and Defence Policy, ESDP, expectations of the EU enlargement were less than enthusiastic, not to say directly sceptical. Scepticism quite naturally had to do with numbers. The EU enlargement of ten new members – most likely followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 with Croatia possibly in 2009 – will necessarily test all ESDP bodies, the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee etc.⁷ Since consensus on security and defence actions would have to be reached not merely between 15 members states – including four neutrals – but after enlargement between 25 member states – including 10 newcomers of which eight were relatively new and rather enthusiastic, pro-American members of NATO, managing international crises in a wider and more diverse environment would invariably have to raise considerable difficulties, not to speak of taking concrete, military actions involving national troop contributions from smaller and financially weaker member states. ESDP relies heavily on the resources, which the member states are able and willing to commit. And their differences in size and capabilities, external policy and strategic interests as well as perceptions of budgetary commitments all add to the potential insecurity about the role of the new Member States in the future ESDP. The EU enlargement is thus widely expected to have consequences for the ESDP, so much the more as the policy in general and its potential for implementation is still in the making. Such consequences may influence the perspective of EU decision-makers about present and future EU activities in the field of crisis management and the methods available to implementation of a wider CFSP and a stronger ESDP.⁸ A special aspect of interest will be for decision-makers of the older members of the EU to identify areas of common interest with one or more of the new members and potential for new intra-EU alliances. In particular a former group like the Visegrad4 may be expected to try to continue cooperation patterns from the pre-accession period.

⁷ Shepherd, p. 54, Missiroli, 2003 (1), p. 12.

⁸ For an earlier discussion of this issue in 2002, see Missiroli, 2002, p. 12.

The European Integration Framework in Perspective

The Maastricht Treaty states that the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. This formulation was spelled out in the Petersberg tasks of June 1992 to include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. During the rather turbulent first half of the 1990s, beginning with the American-led Gulf War of 1991 and up through the shocking wars in Yugoslavia with ethnic cleansing and losses of hundreds of thousands of civilian lives, this rather declaratory policy was all the EU had, until the Petersberg tasks were incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 after enlargement with the three neutrals of Austria, Finland and Sweden. The Amsterdam Treaty opened up the possibility of integrating the military dimension (WEU) into the EU; but it also created the position of Secretary General/High Representative, which after entry into force in 1999 led to the appointment of former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana as the Foreign and Security Policy leader of the EU.

The first operational opportunity for the EU after the Amsterdam Treaty came in 1997 in *Albania*, which disintegrated unexpectedly and violently almost overnight. The Albania crisis was initially handled by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, simultaneously with the EU. But while the latter in principle had the crisis management tools ready for this type of event, it was not possible to obtain the support of the main EU players for their use. It thus rather surprisingly became the OSCE which demanded and instantly got the authorization of the UN Security Council to gather a 'coalition-of-the-willing', military, peacekeeping force 'Operation Alba' under Italian leadership, as well as civilian crisis management in the form of a local OSCE Mission in Tirana. The EU might have had the tools, but could obviously not agree at the time to use them.

On this background it was less surprising that the next Balkan crisis in *Kosovo* building up in 1998 was again left to the OSCE to try to manage. This time with a 1,200 personnel monitoring mission under American leadership. When the Rambouillet negotiations failed in March 1999, the military intervention was left to NATO (although this time without UN Security Council authorization). In

the air campaign against Serbia and Montenegro around 3/5 of all sorties were flown by American planes which delivered 4/5 of all precision-guided munitions. Cruise missiles as well as Intelligence were almost exclusively American.⁹ Ground troops only materialized after the high intensity fighting was over, and then in the form of NATO forces. To the EU the Kosovo failure played a major role, as it triggered a common desire to develop, within the Union framework, all the instruments necessary for defusing crisis.

The *Balkan* failures thus lead to a necessary rethinking of the ESDP framework. This process was led by the British Government, which was in some respects, for instance in relation to the Euro currency, marginalized within the EU. The UK initiated a series of top level meetings starting in 1998 and continuing the following years which laid the ground to the new start of a concrete ESDP. It is therefore not misplaced to state that the military ESDP was not developed as a theoretical exercise, but rather under pressure of the reality having confronted the EU and its Member States, as demonstrated in former Yugoslavia. The EU added another concrete dimension to the ESDP when in 2000 it reaffirmed its commitment to reinforce the Union's external action through the development of not merely a military crises management capability, but now also a civilian one. New concrete targets were set in 2001 for civilian aspects of crisis management which should be achieved by 2003 through voluntary contributions.

In sum, the EU is in the middle of a process of developing a minimum of instruments and capabilities, both civilian and military, which are essential for the Union to obtain international credibility. These tools then have to be incorporated into a global strategic concept, which has been described as a sort of general philosophy for the Union's actions in the world. This is the European Security Strategy, ESS, approved in December 2003, which builds on past experience of regional conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the break-up of states such as Albania and the fight against large scale organized crime as demonstrated by the drugs smuggling and trafficking from neighbouring regions.

At the same time, the internal geometry of the EU is undergoing fundamental changes. Contrary to much public belief, the Iraq rift between the Elysee-countries of France and Germany (supplemented by the other Tervuren countries of Belgium and Luxembourg) on the one hand, and the 'group of eight' (letter of

⁹ Giegrich, p.166.

Heads of State and Government) led by Britain, Spain and Italy, but including all Visegrad4, has not led to a melt down of the EU decision making process.¹⁰ Through a series of exclusive working summits with France and Germany, the UK took the initiative to try to fix disagreements by adding more power to the ESDP. The strategy seems to have been the same as with the Franco-British entente in connection with the Kosovo crisis in 1998-99, and the working hypothesis again, that by concentrating on reality more than ideological politics the EU would be able to develop the ESDP and thus strengthen the European integration. Such a British strategy involving the new members in Central and Eastern Europe would fit well into a historical pattern of British European politics. Also in NATO, building up military cooperation involving smaller European countries seems to have fitted well into British interests in European security.¹¹ The difference between historical experience and the British ESDP reinvigorating initiative is rather, that while historically London has more often than not tried to outbalance Paris or Berlin or Moscow as the case might have been, then the ESDP on the contrary maintains the potential of traditional alliances such as has been widely expected for historical reasons between Paris and Warsaw and Berlin (the 'Weimar Triangle') or between Germany and its eastern and southern neighbours. Furthermore, and maybe equally to the point, the ESDP development underway promises a re-balancing of transatlantic relations by strengthening the EU side, which seems to be high on the agenda of not only British interests, but also of the Barroso Commission of 2004.

NATO has in practice been effectively led by the US, and the Alliance enlargement eastwards tends to influence its decision making capacity only modestly. In contrast the EU has no similar centre of gravity on which to rely in its decision-making processes. Instead Solana as Secretary General and High Representative was assigned to lead a drive towards fixing disagreements after the Iraq rift by introducing the ESS. After its confirmation Solana has in practice taken the lead of the EU's global role and was in 2004 nominated as the Union's future Foreign Minister, a role that implies development of a European External Action Service, as agreed with the Constitutional Treaty.¹² Until entry into force of this Treaty, Solana has assumed his new role as chief executive of a leadership consortium of

¹⁰ See Osica, Sedivy.

¹¹ E.g. Khol, 2004, p.3.

¹² On the Foreign Minister, see Sir Brian Crowe and on the EEAS, see Simon Duke. For a more general discussion of these innovations of the Constitutional Treaty and ESDP and post-nationalism, see Keane.

EU powers including Britain and France plus Germany.¹³ This practice, informal as it is, is broadly accepted by the other members of the EU as a vehicle of the building up in practice of the ESDP. An example of this practice is seen in the efforts to contribute to managing the crisis in the Darfur province in a discrete and sensitive manner and thus in practice recognized at 25.

At the enlargement of the EU there were expectations of a slow down of the decision making process, strained by the mere presence of 25 voices around the table. However, as the build-up of the integrated military-civilian take-over-from-NATO operation 'Althea' in Bosnia demonstrates, that has not happened. On the contrary, 'Althea' was launched entirely as scheduled before the end of 2004. As a test case for the political will of the enlarged Union, the biggest military and civilian operation of ESDP involving 7,000 personnel has been started as a major accomplishment. Although the Visegrad4 did not during membership negotiations and the enlargement process act uniformly as a group, there are already signs that they intend to do so at least on a case-by-case basis, as vis-à-vis the Western Balkans supplemented by Austria and Slovenia. Informally this group is known in Brussels as the 'Visegrad4 + 2'. Such leading roles are entirely acceptable to ESDP, as long as they are practiced in a constructive way, e.g. to improve Rule of Law or development of Justice at a regional level cross borders of the new Member States. The Hungarian role in the fall of 2004 towards perceived minority problems in Vojvodina of Serbia may serve as the most recent example.

International coalitions within the EU cannot, however, substitute for genuine multilateral decision making. The EU working procedures are still relatively unfamiliar to the new Member States. Instructions from their capitals are not always constructive or to the point of the decisions in the making. The EU system and its former members have developed a quite pragmatic working method, while the new members often and sometimes for reasons of uncertainty harbour formalistic views on for example Human and Minority Rights in their neighbouring countries. On the other hand, and especially in the Western Balkans, traditional ties to democratic Serbs have also coloured the Visegrad4 positions to a solution of the question of the future status of Kosovo. In general, the new members states have not yet been able to exert full institutional influence within the EU system. So much the more as they are still under-represented

¹³ Interview in the EU Council Secretariat, November 2004.

in many of the institutional structures on External Relations of Commission and Council.

The EU external relations are in general under scrutiny in the Budget process for the period of 2007-13. The Commission has launched a proposal for establishing six external aid instruments covering, (1) Pre-Accession for remaining and new candidate countries, (2) European Neighbourhood Policy towards the East and South, (3) Development Cooperation overseas, (4) Humanitarian Aid, (5) Macro-Financial assistance and – of particular relevance for ESDP – (6) Stability, aimed at tackling crises and instability in third countries including transborder challenges, such as nuclear safety, non-proliferation, organized crime and terrorism.¹⁴ Under the previous budget this latter Stability instrument has been relatively limited, but a substantial increase is under consideration, possibly at three times the present level from 55 m € per year to 170 m € per year in 2007-13. In addition to this facility the Commission imagines a further financial facility of relevance to the ESDP in a proposal for a Defence Research Programme for internal security and external missions of up to 1 bn € per year.¹⁵ The Stability instrument is furthermore intended to be supplementary to other policy driven instruments of which the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument is obviously of particular interest to the Visegrad4 since it contains the very important component of cross-border and regional cooperation.

The Visegrad4 believe in coherence between these budget instruments and the political ambitions of the Member States. Member States in general are, however, reluctant to deliver on the financial side, which is also a question of relevant procedures of decision making. The Ambassadors of the Political and Security Committee have in the process played a constructive role, but have been limited to Foreign Affairs and hence under instructions from the respective national Ministries of Foreign Affairs. In future, decisions concerning the relevant external budget instruments may have to involve also national financial authorities as in the permanent representatives committee of Coreper or a similar committee of plenipotentiary ambassadors. The future financial situation is dependent not only on Member States, but also and increasingly on the European Parliament with its sovereign responsibility for the Budgets of the Union. The involvement of the Parliament in the budget procedure for 2007-13 on external relations is

¹⁴ Manca.

¹⁵ Cameron and Quille, p. 22-25.

still a separate and outstanding question, but will probably focus on issues such as protection against WMD and the fight against terrorism.

Finally in order to secure synergy between the Member States in Council and the Commission, the Constitutional Treaty needs to enter into force and the single EU Foreign Minister to become in charge as both President of the European Council and deputy chairman of the Commission.

The European Security Strategy of 2003

The enlargement brings in different strategic traditions and orientations as well as Member States of vastly varying size. The aim of the ESS was therefore to reach an agreement sufficiently broad to include these variations but still precise enough to become a blueprint for international action. The Strategy followed not only the 2001 terror attacks on American cities but also the American strategic response to terrorism in the National Security Strategy of 2002. It was therefore important that the European blueprint not only responded to the global situation at hand, but also contributed to credibility in the eyes of major international actors, in particular the United States.¹⁶

The ESS identifies the main global challenges and threats as terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. Additionally it includes the possibility of a combination of several – if not in a worst case scenario all – of these threats. To address the new threats, a broad approach is needed, starting with political and diplomatic preventive measures and resort to the competent international organizations. Next step would be coercive measures under the UN Charter and international law, in which case the UN Security Council would assume a central role. The traditional concept of territorial self-defence, based on the threat of invasion, is found to be insufficient, and with the new threats the first line of defence will often be abroad. The risk of proliferation of WMD grows over time, and the threat of terrorism tends to become more dangerous if left unattended. State failure and organized crime – often connected on the ground – tend to spread across borders. In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats are purely military, nor can they be tackled by purely military means; each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation of WMD may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions, but military assets and effective policing may be needed in

¹⁶ For a comprehensive discussion of the European Security Strategy, see Toje, 2004.

the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian management helps restore civilian government. The EU is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations as an economic cooperation supplemented by political and military potential.

The ESS also specifically states that enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe, and that the integration of acceding states increases European security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. It says that as a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 bn € on defence, it should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. The EU could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.¹⁷

¹⁷ See Becher for a comprehensive discussion.

New European Strategies

The EU enlargement corresponded chronologically within just a few weeks with NATO enlargement, offering the necessary security guarantee to those new EU Member States not already allies since 1999. The last Visegrad⁴ country to become an ally was Slovakia. The main perceived threat to the Visegrad⁴ – as well as to the new Baltic Member States – building on historical experience of major power domination, is undoubtedly neighbouring Russia. But while Alliance membership is primarily a matter of security consumption, the EU membership is much more a matter of supply as well as consumption. The EU is not offering any hard security guarantee, but is increasingly concerned with matters of national minorities, cross-border trade, visa regulations, energy and environmental issues, Balkan stability, relations with Belarus and Moldova and increasingly with Ukraine and of course Russia. In all of these areas the new EU members will be interested in contributing to better security. The threats described in the European Strategy of terrorism, proliferation of WMD (and risks related to obsolete nuclear power), regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime are exactly the challenges confronting particularly the Visegrad⁴ when they look across their – and the EU's – external borders. The new EU partners therefore wish to be pro-active and bring new focus to the area covered by the New Neighbours Policy (Ex-Soviet and Mediterranean), but also to the Western Balkans. In both areas the Visegrad⁴ will have immediate and direct interest in creating more democratic and stable regimes. As participants in the common efforts of the Union, they will add their own experience of country transition after communism. In their efforts to promote the New Neighbours Policy they will be able to draw on other EU external policies such as the Northern dimension and the Barcelona Process and will see EU's Eastern dimension as relatively balanced with other EU external policies.

The Baltic States and the Visegrad⁴ will add new focus to *relations with Russia*, but the enlargement as well as the historical experience of the new members may cause worries and polarization within EU on relations with Russia. Russia's role in the Kosovo crisis was a demonstration of traditional geopolitical interests that could just as well have materialized in relations with other countries of the former Soviet sphere of influence. Russian hesitance concerning the European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation within the OSCE, particularly in relation to its neighbouring countries of Moldova and Georgia, will give rise to concern

amongst the new EU Member States. The sensitive question in 2002 of transit to and from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad created difficulties for EU not only with Russia but also within the EU itself. The same happened with the extension of the bilateral agreement with Russia to the new members, which caused tensions amongst EU members. The EU had substantial difficulties with finding a common attitude to Russian reactions after the Beslan massacre in North Ossetia and again towards the failed Presidential elections in neighbouring Ukraine. It is evident that not only the new members, but also neighbouring Finland, have a strong interest in democratization of Russia and fear Russian efforts at power play within the EU. The Russian attitude towards war on terror with its emphasis on government control of society, including not least the free press, is accentuated by the protracted and tragic situation in Chechnya.

The political leaders of the Visegrad4, who in many cases have personal views on and experience with Human Rights issues, will be unfavourable to compromise on compliance with formal Human Rights. They thereby risk opposing more established, pragmatic EU views on relations with Russia. The EU's Russia-policy is still under construction and the Visegrad4 will almost certainly try to strengthen the political demands of the Union within the four common spaces being created with Russia. These common spaces cover economic issues and the environment, issues of freedom, security and justice, external security, including crisis management and non-proliferation and finally research and education, including cultural aspects.

Enlargement pushed the EU's frontier eastwards directly to *Belarus* and *Ukraine* and indirectly to *Moldova*, all three countries which are going through severe political problems, and each of them representing security concerns of the Visegrad4.¹⁸ Failed elections in both Belarus and Ukraine and later elections in Moldova could not help being monitored with more than normal scrutiny since regime failure would have consequences both for national minorities inside the potentially failed states, but also for neighbouring areas now within the EU. One of the last issues negotiated on the Polish entry into the Union was exactly a financial contribution of the EU to control of the Polish eastern border towards Ukraine. Cross-border and regional cooperation with Ukraine is a priority not only for Poland but also for neighbouring Slovakia and Hungary, and so is further rapprochement of that country to the EU. In EU efforts to

¹⁸ See also Valasek, p. 49.

contribute to normalizing and democratizing Belarus, Poland obviously works along the same lines as the Baltic countries, in particular Lithuania.

In the EU's *relations to the Western Balkans*, Hungary pursues a leading role, not least vis-à-vis Serbia, related to a substantial Hungarian minority in the cross-border Serbian province of Vojvodina. Already in the first Hungarian year of membership this special relationship has been put on the EU agenda. And Hungary places particular emphasis on the importance of the future status of Kosovo, precisely because any Kosovo solution could – and probably would – have spill-over consequences for the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. It is therefore not surprising that the Visegrad4 have started their membership of the EU with introducing proposals for constructing the future status of Kosovo. This was done in collaboration with Slovenia, having former constitutional ties with Yugoslavia, and with Austria, having historical ties with the Western Balkans. It is after all less than a century since the Habsburg Empire of Vienna played a dominant role in the area. In modern times, of course, the economic bonds were not only close internally in Yugoslavia but also within the then Comecon, which led to substantial Hungarian and Polish economic interests in the Western Balkans; interests that have not necessarily become obsolete after the EU enlargement. In the 1990s the Visegrad4 and Slovenia were furthermore joint members of the CEFTA. Another special relationship between the new EU members and former Yugoslavia is obviously that Slovenia as a former part of that country carries a legacy of not finally solved, contested borders with Croatia, especially at sea.

New Overseas Strategies

The EU *relations overseas* are less interesting for the new members, and maybe particularly for the Visegrad4. None of these four countries have had traditional ties overseas such as colonies or dependencies in Africa or Asia. This is of course a major difference compared to the older EU members states, not only the traditional colonial powers in Africa, but also the Nordic countries, which after the second World War developed special relations to a number of African countries on the basis of their substantial financial and technical assistance to countries south of Sahara, particularly in East Africa. Also Greece has traditionally had global interests, although mainly in the form of overseas shipping. Austria traditionally had geopolitical interests to the immediate South in the Balkans and East, and so have the Visegrad4. Their interest in Africa, Asia or for that matter South America has been rather limited and in modern times mostly seems to have been a consequence of Soviet politics under the Cold War. Eastern European export of military equipment has taken place to countries in Africa, and educational and academic exchanges have occurred resulting in personal bonds, but not to an extent comparable with that of the older EU Member States. Not surprisingly these new Member States have the same interest as most other countries worldwide in events in the Great Lakes area or in the Darfur province, but not more than others in humanitarian or social circumstances. As far as Africa is concerned the Visegrad4 will hardly out of national interest be enthusiastic about military operations, mainly due to fear of being dragged into an area of the World where they have no special interest, limited direct experience or expertise, virtually no extra resources to invest and limited control over the conduct of operations.

The *Middle East* may play a somewhat different role, not only for its traditional ties with major EU members states, in particular Britain and France, and for relations with Member States as Greece and now also Cyprus, but obviously for its geographical proximity and thus the risk of spill-over, for instance in the form of refugees. Also the risk of proliferation of WMD is felt much more real from countries in the Middle East, than from countries in Asia. But if the question is asked about risks connected to civilian use of nuclear power, concerns would undoubtedly be much greater having Chernobyl in relatively fresh memory, about the former Soviet countries to the East of the Visegrad4. And

ultimately the threat of Russian WMD becomes a much higher priority than the potential WMD of Iran.

The ESDP, however, is not constructed as a menu with a free choice. On the contrary full participation – in theory of all 25 member states – is essential, and to date the ESDP operations, at least the more substantial military ones in the Western Balkans, Macedonia and Bosnia, have attracted contributions from all members states, but also from then candidate states like the Visegrad⁴. In future the most immediately likely *ESDP operations in Africa*, as agreed within the EU, will demand generation of further support. The EU has agreed on a Common Position on the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa, and military staff-to-staff dialogue has taken place with the African Union and sub-regional organizations. This work, central to which is the principle of African ownership, is being taken forward with a view to developing a coherent and comprehensive EU response to peace-building in Africa and support for the development of African capabilities. It will be important to co-ordinate these activities with overall EU policy on Africa and the actions of individual Member States and to take account of the work of the UN, the African Union and sub regional organizations. In Africa not only geopolitical or other national interests of EU Member States are at stake. The further development of ESDP will be driven more by concrete demands than by political intentions alone. Just as the ESDP rapid development in the 1990s was driven much by developments in EU neighbouring areas in the Western Balkans, so the further development of military capacities is not a theoretical or training exercise, but a project driven by demand. In this process in particular the new Member States, and therefore the Visegrad⁴, are expected to play their part as suppliers of security. Their interest in CFSP as well as ESDP has therefore been growing quite rapidly since introduction in the EU decision making process in early 2003 and through actual accession in 2004.

Military Capabilities and Battle Groups

The specific provisions of the Constitutional Treaty state that the Union shall be provided with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The EU may use them in missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

Military Capabilities were initially defined in the Helsinki Headline Goals but later updated to be fulfilled in 2003 by 100.000 personnel, 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels. In reality these capabilities were, however, limited and constrained by shortfalls regarding a number of enabling factors relating to land, maritime and air forces as well as communications, intelligence, strategic mobility etc. These limitations or constraints were on deployment time – especially risky at the upper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity – in particular when conducting concurrent operations. Special attention was devoted to factors such as strategic air lift, air-to-air refuelling, headquarters, nuclear-biological-and-chemical protection, special operations forces, theatre ballistic missile defence, unmanned aerial vehicles, space based assets as well as interoperability issues and working procedures for evacuation and humanitarian operations. Also considered were strategic sealift, medical support, attack helicopters and support helicopters. The ambitious Helsinki Headline Goals were none the less declared operational in 2003. The accession states including the Visegrad⁴ contributed to their fulfilling by making voluntary contributions to the Headline Goals, mainly ground troops, but also for instance naval and air support, field hospitals and transport helicopters.¹⁹

The Helsinki Headline Goals served as much as a political signal about the need in 1999 of strengthening the European military arm after the almost traumatic experiences in the Western Balkans, as they served practical purposes. A bit like the Elysee-partners initiative in the early 1990s of forming a substantial Eurocorps, the initial Headline Goals represented a top-down approach to ESDP capabilities very much at the declaratory level. Lacking important strategic capabilities in the areas of reconnaissance, command and control, transport and logistics

¹⁹ Khol, 2003, p. 14-15, Missiroli, 2003 (1), p. 5.

as well as precision guided stand-off munitions, the forces that the EU states have thus far been able to contribute are useful only for operations beneath the peace enforcement threshold.²⁰

With the ESS of December 2003 a new set of Headline Goals were needed, and in May 2004 the EU Defence Ministers adopted the Headline Goal 2010 endorsed by the Heads of State and Government in June. These new ambitions for military capabilities include a number of interesting, new thoughts, in particular the introduction of rapidly deployable Battle Groups. A Battle Group (BG) is defined as the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations. The BG is based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. (Combat Support includes i.a. air defence, reconnaissance, intelligence, helicopters and forward air control; Combat Service Support includes i.a. logistic and medical support and military police.) A BG is in principle based on multi-nationality and could be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States. Member States are invited to include the non-EU European NATO countries, candidates for accession and other potential partners in their BGs, as was the case with Norway.²¹ In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria. A BG must be associated with a Force Headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics.

The BG concept, elaborated jointly by France, Germany and the UK before presentation and approval of the entire EU, caught the interest of all Member States including the new members among them the Visegrad4. Whereas their earlier, voluntary contributions seem to have been offered probably as much as a formal reverence to membership of the ESDP, the BGs received more than the intended and needed support already at the first Military Capabilities Commitments Conference after enlargement, which was held by the 25 Ministers of Defence in November 2004. *The Czech Republic* committed to form a BG with Austria and Germany, *Hungary* with Italy and Slovenia, while *Poland* and *Slovakia* announced a BG with Germany, Latvia and Lithuania. One particular advantage of the BG concept is that it offers – and is perceived to offer – partici-

²⁰ Shepherd, p. 48.

²¹ Statement by ESDP Presidency, Dutch Defence Minister Kamp, 22 November 2004.

pation to both big and small military powers. Especially it offers smaller powers the possibility of pooling resources, of role specialization and complementarity of capabilities. This latter ambition also with regard to financial rationality is important not least for new Member States, who in addition to adjusting generally to EU membership, want to cash in on the peace dividend in Europe after the Cold War. It is significant that all EU Member States except Denmark have committed military capabilities to BGs or alternatively niche capabilities – including the Baltic States and Cyprus. These commitments should provide the EU with initial operational capability of BGs in 2005 (France and the UK in the first half and Italy in the second) and 2006 (France and Germany as leaders and a multinational BG based on Spanish-Italian amphibious and landing forces). Full operational capability of BGs involving the Visegrad4 commitments should then be reached from 2007 and onwards. From then on the EU intends to have the capacity to undertake two concurrent BG-sized rapid response operations. To qualify as an EU BG, force packages will have to meet commonly defined and agreed standards and undergo a generation process, involving a series of regular generation conferences. EU and NATO have started to address overall coherence and complementarity between BGs and the NATO forces, including compatibility of standards, practical methods and procedures.

Intelligence – military as well as civilian – as a requested capability has often been left out of much concrete security and defence discussion in the EU, but this situation may be expected to change. Intelligence plays a vital role in the process of developing common security policies and in giving the ESS substance.²² To formulate common security policies, the EU member states need a common threat perception and following from that common threat assessments. If the so-called ‘new threats’ of for instance terrorism or organized crime are to be tackled collectively, it is not only desirable but also necessary to make collective threat assessments. The Visegrad4 with their historical ties to the east and south bring privileged positions into the EU on the new neighbouring areas. To mention just one example, the number of EU embassies in Moldova doubled over-night by the enlargement, because of the Visegrad4 embassies in Chisinau. The EU has established four mechanisms for intelligence in general, namely a Situation Centre and an intelligence division of the European Military Staff both in Brussels, the EU Satellite Centre in Madrid and the police institution of Europol. In order for these institutions to operate properly one improvement would be to

²² Giegrich, p. 175-176. For a general discussion of EU Intelligence, see Müller-Wille.

secure that Europol of the joint institutions should cooperate closer under the common EU Foreign Minister with the multilateral ESDP agencies.

The Visegrad4 military capabilities commitments must be seen in the perspective of their relatively modest defence budgets, ranging from Poland's growing defence budget of 4 bn USD, roughly the size of the Greek defence budget, to Slovakia's defence budget of merely 0,6 bn USD , also growing, but still less than the Irish defence budget. It is therefore not surprising that their capabilities commitments to the ESDP are expected to be generally double-hatted with their contributions to NATO forces.²³ NATO – in a parallel process to the BG development – is building up a so-called NATO Response Force. In its current plans, this rapid reaction force is made up entirely of European forces, and it is mainly a mechanism for developing European military forces in qualitative terms. While the ESDP is seeing a considerable growth in volume, it does not duplicate NATO build up since the EU is not developing a permanent chain of command or separate procedures. In stead the EU is significantly pursuing an integrated approach of civilian and military capabilities to crisis management. The new Member States in general may be less prepared for such a comprehensive approach, but the Visegrad4 recognize the added value of comprehensive crisis management and see it as an opportunity for national visibility in an international context.

²³ Book (2003).

Civilian Capabilities and Headline Goals

Civilian capabilities were committed simultaneously with military capabilities at the EU Civilian Capabilities Commitments Conference in November 2004. Member States indicative commitments in the areas of police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection far exceeded the concrete targets set by the European Council. Member States also committed monitoring capabilities and capabilities for generic support functions for civilian crisis management missions and for EU Special Representatives, EUSRs. Member States reiterated their strong commitment to the further development of civilian crisis management capabilities and stressed that shortcomings on issues such as mission and planning support, adequate financing, the ability of the EU to deploy at short notice and procurement needed to be addressed urgently. With a view to this a Civilian Headline Goal was developed with a target date of 2008 in order to secure interoperability, deploy ability and sustainability of civilian resources. This Headline Goal sets out the EU's ambitions for civilian ESDP for the coming years and provides a firm basis for identifying requirements and establishing the capabilities needed. The Civilian Headline Goal also establishes a systematic approach for the further development of civilian capabilities. As a follow up to the EU Action Plan for civilian aspects of ESDP, a meeting was organized with Non-Governmental Organizations addressing the involvement of civil society in EU civilian crisis management.

The Visegrad⁴ took this first opportunity concerning civilian capabilities after full membership of the EU to commit personnel of all categories: police, rule of law, civil administration, and support to EUSRs, monitoring and civil protection. Numbers were relatively modest and mainly divided between police personnel and intervention teams for civil protection. It is understandable that new Member States which are still in the process of adapting to EU legislation and administration find it difficult to offer civilian personnel for ESDP operations. But even compared to the other new members like the Baltic States, contributions are modest. The Visegrad⁴, on the other hand, posses valuable experience in precisely some of the activities covered by the Civilian Headline Goals 2008, such as security sector reform and support to demobilization and reintegration processes. A concrete first example of the EU integrated civilian-military approach should be the NATO-take-over operation 'Althea' in Bosnia from 2005 and onwards. Whether experience in Bosnia might lead to further

EU efforts in Kosovo, which is an area of particular concern to the Visegrad4 remains to be seen, especially after negotiations on Kosovo's final status beginning in 2005.

Conclusions

Before entering the EU the Visegrad4 in general considered the ESDP acceptable mainly as a European Security and Defence Identity within or under supervision of NATO or as a European pillar inside the Alliance. After enlargements NATO is still offering the new members a security guarantee and by American involvement in Europe a counterweight against what is perceived as a threat of Russian influence in internal affairs of the Member States and the EU. The EU at the other hand is offering especially through the Battle Group concept co-ordination and division of labour and at the same time developing interoperability and standardization. The BGs offer participation to all EU partners, whether big or small, and offers in particular smaller countries opportunities of pooling resources, role specialization and complementarities of capabilities. Scarce financial, technical and human resources have to be channelled towards viable objectives. Similar considerations will probably apply to defence procurement, where European defence contractors are increasingly competitive and where EU industrial policy will make progress of European integration more advantageous in the perspective of the EU Defence Research Programme for internal security and ESDP missions.²⁴

The EU crisis management operations will have their geographical focus constrained by shortfalls in enabling factors such as strategic mobility, specifically strategic capabilities as transport and logistics, command and control as well as reconnaissance. The EU's global Approach on Deployability is a key element of ESDP development. EU project groups on strategic transport need to address recognized shortfalls and provide solutions, both for airlift and sealift. In the medium term more effective use of existing coordination structures and existing transport assets could extend the EU baseline for operations beyond the present limitations. The EU Action Plan for ESDP support to peace and security in Africa aims to support the continent in building autonomous conflict prevention and management capabilities with special attention to the African Union. At present capacity, the EU range of operation has to be stretched to the limits in order to cover the whole of the African continent, but in any case EU crisis management is likely to be expanded to some recent crisis areas in connection with the generation process of Battle Groups. An autonomous and global role

²⁴ For an overview of Visegrad4 Defence Industries, see Behr.

of the EU would presuppose an even wider maximum range of operations than the present presumably 6,000 km.²⁵

In 2005 the EU intends to develop civilian-military coordination of military and civilian capabilities and to allow the civilian/military cell of the EU Military Staff with the participation of various EU institutions including the Commission to begin its work including the establishment of an operations centre which should be available in the course of the year. This operations centre would allow the EU to become independent of either facilities of NATO or a lead Member State for the chain of command of a specific crisis management operation, especially integrating military with civilian capabilities.

The Visegrad4 in general express considerable interest in EU external policies vis-a-vis their immediate neighbours to the east and south which constitute areas of immediate concern in accordance with the ESS and are natural candidates for the EU watch list. The presence of national minorities, cross-border trade – legal as well as illegal including organized criminal activities – risks of failing states and regional instability in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region all add to the conviction of these new Member States, that the geographical focus should correspond to the actual practical as well as financial capacity of the ESDP. The expanded global role of the Union is underway driven forward mainly by the older Member States, but presumably with no other reservations from the new Member States than what follows from budgetary restraints. The Visegrad4 believe that finance should follow competence, and willingness of Member States to contribute to the common budget accordingly. It would be overly optimistic to expect that the interests of the new Member States will necessarily coincide with the interests of the older partners and their priorities as regards security and defence. A certain international division of labour may therefore evolve around the EU and NATO at least in the short term, and the American global role is likely to receive continued support.

In conclusion the proclaimed global role of the EU depends to a large extent on the European ability to generate sufficient resources to overcome shortfalls in enabling factors of the ESDP. The most probable first consequence of the EU enlargement eastwards might on the contrary be a higher priority of the ESDP with the new neighbouring areas to the East and Southeast.

²⁵ Missiroli, 2004, p. 132.

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